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FROM FOX TO HEDGEHOG: WARREN’S ALL THE KING’S MEN  





[Fut,] I should have been that I am, had the maidenl’est star in the 
firmament twinkled on my bastardizing.—Edmund in King Lear1 
 
 
 Novels with a significant historiographic component, that is, novels that implicitly 
or explicitly foreground philosophies or problems of history writing, frequently call into 
question or parody modern scientific method. For many of these novels the ambiance is 
nevertheless experimental. In The Art of the Novel, Milan Kundera has remarked that “the 
novelist is neither historian nor prophet: he is an explorer of existence” and, further,  that 
“a character is not a simulation of a living being. It is an imaginary being. An 
experimental self .”2 Kundera’s observations provide a foundation for the following 
approach to the historiographic novel: an illumination of Leo Tolstoy’s experimental 
epilogue to War and Peace via the experimental devices of a second author, Robert Penn 
Warren, in the 1946 novel All the King’s Men. 
 Isaiah Berlin concluded his analysis of the second epilogue to War and Peace 
with the observation that Tolstoy had ended his life as “the most tragic of the great 
writers, a desperate old man, beyond human aid, wandering self-blinded at Colonus.” 
Berlin suggests thereby the fate of any thinker who finds himself divided between two 
views of the world, “between the universal and all-important but delusive experience of 
free will, the feeling of responsibility, the values of private life generally, on the one 
hand;  and on the other, the reality of inexorable historical determinism.”3  
The greater part of Tolstoy’s epilogue is given to dismissal of historical theories 
that reject the will of a deity as a force in history, but which proceed nonetheless 
according to the same basic assumptions: “Modern history has rejected the faiths of the 
ancients, without putting any new conviction in their place; and the logic of the position 
has forced the historians, leaving behind them the rejected, divine right of kings and fate 
of the ancients, to come back by a different path to the same point again: to the 
recognition, that is (1) that peoples are led by individual persons; and (2) that there is a 
certain goal towards which humanity and the peoples constituting it are moving.”4 
Tolstoy developed this paradox and in so doing devastated the assumptions of 
biographical, intellectual, and cultural historians. Even while noting Tolstoy’s critical 
lucidity, Berlin allows “the immense superiority of Tolstoy’s offensive over his defensive 
weapons:” Tolstoy “longed for a universal explanatory principle;  that is the perception of 
resemblances or common origins, or single purpose, or unity in the apparent variety of 
the mutually exclusive bits and pieces which composed the furniture of the world. . . . all 
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his life he looked for some edifice strong enough to resist his engines of destruction and 
his mines and battering rams; he wished to be stopped by an immovable obstacle, he 
wished his violent projectiles to be resisted by impregnable fortifications.”5 The 
fundamental empiricism and the complex and provisional nature of Tolstoy’s own 
attempts to formulate reality—and therein a philosophy of history—left him “wandering 
self-blinded.” Like the targets of his critique, Tolstoy was a victim of his own inability 
successfully to integrate theoretical determinism with an experience of free will. 
 By virtue of its thematic correspondences with Tolstoy’s second epilogue, All the 
King’s Men provides an historiographic laboratory in which to test Tolstoy’s paradox. 
The novel’s protagonist Jack Burden is a failed historian who eventually recovers his 
profession by making an authentic accommodation to the past, a process that painfully 
reconciles historical technique with historical meaning. Many readers have identified the 
politician Willie Stark as the principal character of the novel, a fact that offers another 
correspondence with Tolstoy’s discussion of power, the masses, and individual will. Yet 
the historian Jack Burden maintains that “This has been the story of Willie Stark, but it is 
my story, too. For I have a story. It is the story of a man who lived in the world and to 
him the world looked one way for a long time and then it looked another and very 
different way.”6 With the claim that he tells his own story, the historian Jack Burden 
brings historiography to the foreground of the novel. 
To determine how All the King’s Men—Jack’s story and Willie’s—glosses 
Tolstoy’s second epilogue to War and Peace is to cast Tolstoy’s epilogue as a story itself: 
the insufficiency of modern history and its paradigms as played out by characters—
historians  and their heroes. Having at the outset exposed the fundamental problem of 
modern history—that it dismisses God but preserves unreflectively, inexplicably, the 
concept of unseen agency—Tolstoy defines the science of history by its objective, “the 
self-knowledge of nations and of humanity” (1102). Human beings observe events, writes 
Tolstoy (for instance, “millions of Christians, professing the law of love, murder one 
another”), but more important, we inquire—and we do so involuntarily—why the events 
happen and what they mean. One question of history is whether to frame the human past 
in terms of free or unfree action. This question leads to speculation on the nature of 
power: “If another force is put in the place of the divine power, then it should be 
explained what that force consists of, since it is precisely in that force that the whole 
interest of history lies” (1102, 1104). This is the very question begged by the bastard 
Edmund in King Lear, who scoffed at the stars but still felt himself determined and 
unfree. 
Tolstoy condemns as “contradictory and random” the formulations of 
biographical and national, universal, and cultural history concerning the nature and 
operations of power. For biographical and national historians, power is found in the will 
of individuals. The universal historian, on the other hand, foregoes the framing of 
individual agency and “seeks the cause of the event, not in the power of one person, but 
in the mutual action on one another of many persons connected with the event. . . . Now 
the historical personage is the product of his time, and his power is only the product of 
various forces” (1104, 1105). According to the latter view, power is “a self-sufficient 
force” and may be the consequence or the cause of events. A third category of historians 
studies ideas: “Out of all the immense number of tokens that accompany every living 
phenomenon, these historians select the symptom of intellectual activity, and assert that 
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this symptom is the cause” (1105, 1106). All three types of historian fail adequately to 
address a central question of history, namely, what is the true connection between power 
and activity? Historians’ various answers are approached metaphorically: “A STEAM-
ENGINE moves. The question is asked, How is it moved? A peasant answers, It is the 
devil moving it. Another man says, The steam-engine moves because the wheels are 
going round. A third maintains that the cause of the motion is to be found in the smoke 
floated from it by the wind” (1108). In all three types of history, Tolstoy argues, this 
failure expresses itself (by default in the cases of universal and cultural history) as a 
connection of events to the power residing within individual wills. The problem with this 
understanding of history is that “the only conception which can explain the movement of 
the steamer is the conception of a force equal to the movement that is seen” (1108). To 
understand the movement of many as an expression of the will of one is to force the 
query “By what force did Napoleon do that?” and, by extension, “What is power?” 
(1109). One driven to “change the current paper for the pure gold of a true conception,” 
writes Tolstoy, must ask and answer these questions. According to “the science of law,” 
power lies “outside the person—in those relations in which the person possessing the 
power stands to the masses” (1109, 1110). For all types of history these relations 
theoretically necessitate the delegation of power by masses to an individual. In the three 
historical models, delegation may occur absolutely or conditionally, and the conditions 
under which the delegation of power is accomplished may or may not be apparent. 
 Pointing out logical inconsistencies and the many exceptions they necessitate, 
Tolstoy critiques the three models of delegation of power to an individual. The chief 
epistemological problem is that “without admitting divine intervention in the affairs of 
humanity, we cannot accept power as a cause of events.” The difficulty with causal 
explanations rooted in the concept of power as will arises from the fact that, unlike God, 
a human being “acts in time and himself takes part in the event” (1116, 1117). The degree 
of participation in events, moreover, is in inverse proportion to the level of command. 
Historians produce explanations for an event by sifting the wash of commands preceding 
it and estimating which of these is most likely to have caused the event. This is wrong, 
says Tolstoy. The opposite is true; in reality, “historical characters and their commands 
are dependent on the events” (1121). The events trigger the search for explanations. 
However, the falsely conceived justifications do serve a purpose: 
 
  They remove moral responsibility from those men who produce  
the events. . . . Apart from those justifications, no solution could be  
found for the most obvious question that occurs to one at once on  
examining any historical event; that is, How did millions of men come  
to combine to commit crimes, murders, wars, and so on? . . . every  
event that occurs inevitably coincides with some expressed desire,  
and receiving justification, is regarded as the result of the will of one  
or more persons. (1120) 
 
The epistemological flaws in the justification of an event as an expression of will return 
Tolstoy to the troubling question of power and historical agency. Ultimately, “the 
conception of cause is not applicable” to an historical law he formulates as a result: “the 
movement of peoples is not produced by the exercise of power; nor by intellectual 
activity, nor even by a combination of the two, as historians have supposed; but by the 
activity of all the men taking part in the event” (1121).  
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 The mention of law raises another fundamental concern of history and 
historiography: the experience and possibility of free will. “To conceive a man having no 
freedom,” says Tolstoy, “is impossible except as a man deprived of life” (1124). The idea 
of free will as a sense of choice between “two different courses of action under precisely 
the same circumstances” is the concomitant of consciousness, “the essence of freedom,” 
without which a human being “would be not only unable to understand life, but could not 
live for a single instant” (1123, 1124). And yet reason, experience, and science suggest 
immutable laws to which will is subject. Even one of these laws is destructive of the 
possibility, although not the consciousness, of free will. On the other hand, Tolstoy notes 
that “if every man could act as he chose, the whole of history would be a tissue of 
disconnected accidents” (1122). For Tolstoy the historian confronts this central problem, 
a problem which does not trouble other realms of inquiry. Questions of theology, 
jurisprudence, and ethics must all proceed from a consciousness, and an assumption, of 
human freedom. Natural science, on the other hand, which denies freedom, “can do no 
more in this question than serve to illumine one side of it” (1125). History makes its 
inquiries in a manner that combines the assumptions of natural science and theology, 
forcing the issue: “Man in connection with the general life of humanity is conceived as 
governed by the laws that determine that life. But the same man, apart from that 
connection, is conceived of as free. How is the past life of nations and of humanity to be 
regarded—as the product of the free or not free action of men? That is the question of 
history” (1124). As this formulation suggests, history differs from other areas of inquiry 
in that it deals not only with the nature of human will but with the mode of its 
representation in historiography. Tolstoy goes on to say “the proportion of freedom to 
necessity is decreased or increased, according to the point of view from which the act is 
regarded; but there always remains an inverse ratio between them” (1126). The greater 
the knowledge of the situation in which an action is taken and the greater the distance 
from the time of the action, the more necessity will appear to govern it. In fact, to 
conceive an act as utterly free would require that it be taken outside of space and time, 
and in the “absolute absence of cause” (1130).  
In the final analysis, for Tolstoy, “free will is for history simply an expression for 
what remains unexplained by the laws of men’s life that we know” (1133).7 This 
observation strikes close to the issues of twentieth-century narratological debates. 
Because consciousness of the idea of freedom and its actualization are two different 
things, the relationship between free will and necessity are a matter of historical 
representation or, as Hayden White would have it, “emplotment.” 8 That this formula is 
unsatisfactory to Tolstoy, beyond which he expects history to travel, can be seen in the 
prescriptive words of his epilogue—that it is “essential to surmount a consciousness of an 
unreal freedom and to recognize a dependence not perceived by our senses” (1136). 
Isaiah Berlin finds in Tolstoy the ghost of Oedipus, whose false consciousness of 
freedom drove him to transgress against fate and led him into blindness. At Colonus, 
Oedipus still struggles with the conflict between acquiescence in fate and acceptance of 
personal responsibility. 
 With Jack Burden of All the King’s Men, Robert Penn Warren created a fictional 
character—an experimental self, to use Kundera’s term—in whose story resonates the 
existential, and more significantly the historiographic, crisis of Isaiah Berlin’s 
Tolstoy/Oedipus. All the King’s Men preserves the Tolstoyan tension between experience 
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and representation. In the novel, several metaphors—idealism, image, and picture—bear 
the load of this tension. The novel is an epistemological allegory, a tale in which 
evidence (or experience) overwhelms a priori thinking. In this respect, it is much like 
Voltaire’s Candide, another theodical work that dismantles the deductive approach to 
knowledge. Finally, All the King’s Men is a story that reconciles the human sense of free 
will with unseen and unfathomable power, a reconciliation that eluded Tolstoy. 
Jack Burden is a self-described student of history whose Ph.D. is incomplete 
because of an unfinished dissertation. He is an historian with excellent technique, but 
with no credentials. Most of the story focuses on Jack Burden’s work as an investigator—
a  digger of dirt—for a populist demagogue named Willie Stark. Jack is the narrator and 
uses the first person (with occasional dislocating shifts to third person) to tell Willie’s 
story as well as his own. Much of the story is presented as a series of flashbacks. These, 
like memory, have no respect for chronological time. In the process of living, 
remembering, and telling the story, Jack experiments with numerous world views that 
affect both memory and the conduct of life. His story is one of roles inhabited in greater 
or lesser degrees of frustration: historian, lover, philosopher, husband, son, journalist, 
sidekick, detective, cynic. Jack exists in a state of alienation from these roles even as he 
assumes them. His pluralistic formulations of reality and what it means to be human, and 
his experience of both, continually bespeak a spiritual condition that alternates among 
conviction, confusion, and frank bad faith. 
 Correspondences with several of Tolstoy’s concerns readily appear. Willie Stark’s 
story introduces the concept of individual greatness and the extent of its agency in history 
through what Tolstoy terms “command.” Jack Burden’s career as an historian manqué 
presents the problems of meaning and its representation in history. “World views,” with 
their fallacies and consequences, are evident in the adventures of Jack Burden. He is an 
embodiment of the human condition. All the King’s Men  illustrates numerous additional 
historiographic issues, as an analytical synopsis of the plot will suggest. 
 The first page of the story launches an extended metaphor, an automobile ride in 
which Willie Stark and part of his entourage hurtle in the direction of Willie’s hometown 
of Mason City:  
 
  You look up the highway and it is straight for miles, coming at you, with 
  the black line down the center coming at and at you, black and slick 
  and tarry-shining against the white of the slab, and the heat dazzles 
up from the white slab so that only the black line is clear, coming 
at you with the whine of the tires, and if you don’t quit staring at that 
  line and don’t take a few deep breaths and slap yourself hard on the 
back of the neck you’ll hypnotize yourself and you’ll come to just 
at the moment when the right front wheel hooks over into the black 
dirt shoulder off the slab….  
 
Jack Burden is a passenger. The chauffeur is a man known as Sugar-Boy. And even if the 
automobile is, as some critics have suggested, “a metaphor that embodies the philosophy 
of mechanistic determinism,” it is also an evocation of consciousness, which may form a 
defense against necessity.9 In this summer of 1936 Jack and Willie are on their way to 
mount a publicity stunt, the nostalgic trip to the politician’s childhood home: a visit to the 
old drugstore and reunions with an aging dog and kin. The stunt is cut short by an event 
that will focus the plot. Willie learns that the latest threat to his political ascendancy 
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comes from Judge Montague Irwin, long a Burden family friend and neighbor. He orders 
Jack to get dirt on the Judge to use as political leverage. 
 Thus the opening scene of the book reveals Willie as a ruthless and cynical 
politician. Jack’s subsequent flashbacks reveal another Willie, the Willie of innocent if 
ambitious idealism. At their first meeting (1922) Willie refuses to drink spirits. Willie’s 
youthful tenure as Mason County Treasurer marks him as an honest and uncompromising 
man in the midst of corruption. He unwittingly becomes a “sap” when “the Harrison 
outfit” runs him for governor to split the vote of Harrison’s opponent. The sap turns 
politician when Sadie Burke (later a member of Willie’s entourage) reveals 
unintentionally that he is not a genuine candidate. Sadie’s revelation inaugurates the 
second stage of Willie’s political life, in which his original desire to do good is qualified 
by a new view of the world: “‘there ain’t a thing but dirt on this green God’s globe except 
what’s under water, and that’s dirt too. It’s dirt makes the grass grow’” (45). This view, 
which is both the point of departure and the justification for all of the Boss’s post-sap 
activities, does not collide with Jack’s scattered and cavalier philosophies about 
knowledge and reality until Jack’s past is pulled into Willie’s politics with “The Case of 
the Upright Judge.” To borrow Isaiah Berlin’s well-known distinctions, in the 
formulation of principles Willie Stark appears a hedgehog, whose one principle is “It all 
depends on what you do with the dirt” (Warren, 45).  Jack is a fox, a knower of many 
things.  But Jack inverts the fox principle, in reserving the right to reject the many things 
he knows. He describes himself as “a brass-bound Idealist,” a pseudo-philosophical 
posture that confers the ability to deny the reality of anything he refuses to recognize: “I 
heard somebody open and shut the gate to the barn lot, but I didn’t look around. If I 
didn’t look around it would not be true that somebody had opened the gate with the 
creaky hinges, and that is a wonderful principle for a man to get hold of. I had got hold of 
the principle out of a book when I was in college, and I had hung on to it for grim death. I 
owed my success in life to that principle. It had put me where I was. What you don’t 
know don’t hurt you, for it ain’t real” (30). Rejection of painful realities is, of course, 
predicated upon consciousness of them. Thus the fox proves a poor “brass-bound 
Idealist.” Moreover, Jack takes the Aristotelian position in another of his digressive 
apostrophes that whatever its consequences knowledge is irresistible. In this digression, 
an unopened telegram functions as a metaphor for knowledge. A great eye watches to see 
whether the telegram is opened: 
 
  The eye knows what’s in the envelope, and it is watching you 
  to see you when you open it and know, too. But the clammy, sad  
little foetus which is you way down in the dark which is you too 
lifts up its sad little face and its eyes are blind, and it shivers cold  
inside you for it doesn’t want to know what is in that envelope.  
It wants to lie in the dark and not know, and be warm in its not-knowing.  
The end of man is knowledge, but there is one thing he can’t know.  
He can’t know whether knowledge will save him or kill him. He will  
be killed, all right, but he can’t know whether he is killed because of the  
knowledge which he has got or because of the knowledge which  
he hasn’t got and which if he had it, would save him. There’s the  
cold in your stomach, but you open the envelope, you have to open the 
envelope, for the end of man is to know. (9)  
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Jack’s digressions on the human condition—as well as others on time, history, 
reality, and truth—are numerous, but the above passages indicate the fundamental 
divisions that characterize and impoverish his emotional life. They also suggest the extent 
to which his inadequacies as an historian are rooted in alienation. He comprehends the 
need to know but elects nevertheless to avoid knowledge because it can hurt or kill. To 
the extent that he apprehends it at all, the world is “simply an accumulation of items, 
odds and ends of things like the broken and misused and dust-shrouded things gathered in 
a garret. Or it was a flux of things before his eyes (or behind his eyes) and one thing had 
nothing to do, in the end, with anything else” (189).  
 Jack’s philosophical and emotional detachment attracts Willie, although its roots 
are more obscure than the dramatic events that cause Willie’s spiritual and political 
conversion from idealist-sap to dirt-dealing politician. That Jack himself does not 
comprehend the reasons for his alienation does not deter a growing affinity between the 
two men. Moreover, Jack’s interest in Willie does not rest on Willie’s cynicism or 
political sophistication. It starts at their first meeting at Slade’s bar even before Willie’s 
days as a sap. In the course of this first meeting, Willie inexplicably winks at Jack.  Jack 
later reflects on the meeting: “It was not the Boss. Not to the crude eye of the homme 
sensuel. Metaphysically it was the Boss, but how was I to know? Fate comes walking 
through the door. . . . It comes in just like that, and how are you to know?” (13-14). The 
process of pondering what separates Willie from other men, and by extension what 
distinguishes the great man from the ordinary and inconsequential man, leads to 
expression of the complex determinism that also informs Jack’s thinking: “it is possible 
that fellows like Willie Stark are born outside of luck, good or bad, and luck, which is 
what about makes you and me what we are, doesn’t have anything to do with them, for 
they are what they are from the time they first kick in the womb until the end. And if that 
is the case, then their life history is a process of discovering what they really are, and not, 
as for you and me, sons of luck, a process of becoming what luck makes us” (63). When 
Willie is elected governor, he rescues Jack from a failed career as a journalist and from 
an intermittent syndrome Jack has entitled “The Great Sleep,” which is essentially an 
exacerbation of “brass-bound Idealism.”  
At this point in the chronologically twisted narrative, and against a more recent 
screen of Willie’s near impeachment, the narrative turns to Jack Burden’s family, his 
genteel roots, and his youth. Whenever he goes home to Burden’s Landing as an adult, 
Jack must face a troubled relationship with his mother, trouble connected, in some way 
that Jack does not grasp, to his mother’s marriages. Jack has dubbed the latest of her four 
husbands The Young Executive. The first husband, The Scholarly Attorney, had been 
Jack’s father. The Scholarly Attorney had left suddenly and for no apparent reason when 
Jack was six years old. Thereafter, The Scholarly Attorney lives in urban poverty, 
rendering aid to “unfortunates.” Jack maintains limited contact with The Scholarly 
Attorney. The relationship is defined by a series of arguments about God between 
sophistic Jack and his father, an ash-can theologian who writes religious tracts. Through 
accounts of these arguments, the reader is exposed to more of Jack’s views. Now 
informed by the cynicism of the Boss, many of them concern history and epistemology. 
One example should suffice: “Life is a fire burning along a piece of string . . . and the 
trail of ash, which if a gust of wind does not come, keeps the structure of the string, is 
History, man’s Knowledge . . . and when the fire has burned up all the string, then man’s 
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Knowledge will be equal to God’s Knowledge and there won’t be any fire, which is 
Life.” The Scholarly Attorney dismisses this Hegelian metaphor with the ironic 
accusation that Jack is thinking “in Finite terms.” Jack objects, “‘I’m not thinking at all, 
I’m just drawing a picture’” (151). As an oblique reference to the notion that reality is 
constructed, Jack’s drawing of “pictures” is incompatible with “brass-bound idealism.” 
But Jack is a divided man, as he repeatedly reveals.  
With Jack’s mother at Burden’s Landing are neighbors: Judge Irwin still lives 
there, and childhood friends Adam Stanton and his sister Anne come occasionally to 
spend a weekend at their ancestral home. Anne was Jack’s first love and Adam is a 
doctor; like the Scholarly Attorney and like Jack Burden, both have moved to the city. 
Although no longer consciously in love with Anne, Jack holds an image of her from the 
old days. This image proves an anchor for an otherwise alienated existence: 
 
  We get very few of the true images in our heads of the kind I 
  am talking about, the kind which become more and more vivid for us 
  as if the passage of years did not obscure their reality but, year by year, 
  drew off another veil to expose a meaning which we had only 
  dimly surmised at first. Very probably the last veil will not be 
  removed, for there are not enough years, but the brightness of the 
  image increases and our conviction increases that the brightness 
  is meaning, or the legend of meaning, and without the image our lives 
  would be nothing except an old piece of film rolled on a spool and 
  thrown into a desk drawer among unanswered letters. (118-119) 
 
The image of Anne is significant for several reasons. It competes with Willie’s view of 
reality as dirt. It also competes with Jack’s view of reality as “odds and ends of things 
like the broken and misused and dust-shrouded things gathered in a garret,” which is 
reminiscent of the “mutually exclusive bits and pieces which composed the furniture of 
the world” (189), the view that Berlin ascribes to Leo Tolstoy.10 Most significant is the 
fact that the image, a property both of Jack’s alienated consciousness and his eventual 
accommodation to his humanity, is both timeless and temporal. The image is not a 
construction like the picture Jack draws of fire along a string. Rather, it is a constant, an 
absolute experience of a veiled reality. 
 Several other past relationships offset, but also deepen, Jack’s alienation. Of 
these, the most significant are an oblique relationship with the subject of Jack’s failed 
dissertation, Cass Mastern, and Jack’s relationship with Judge Montague Irwin. In order 
to set the scene for his investigation of Judge Irwin, Jack must tell of his “first excursion 
into the enchantments of the past,” when he was a graduate student in American history, 
working on his Ph.D. Jack relates the story of “This Jack Burden (of whom the present 
Jack Burden, Me, is a legal, biological, and perhaps even metaphysical continuator)” in 
the third person (157). This adds to the effect of estrangement from his past (and thereby 
from himself). It also makes way for the first person account of the Civil War papers that 
Jack is editing for his dissertation: “A large packet of letters, eight tattered, black-bound 
account books tied together with faded red tape, a photograph, about five by eight inches, 
mounted on cardboard and stained in its lower half by water, and a plain gold ring, man-
sized, with some engraving in it, on a loop of string. The past. Or that part of the past 
which had gone by the name of Cass Mastern” (160). The Cass Mastern story that he 
finds in the documents and artifacts drives Jack out of the doctoral program and into the 
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“Great Sleep.” It is the confession of a man who has had an affair with the wife of a dear 
friend. The ensuing events, which include the suicide of the friend and the selling South 
of an innocent slave who has knowledge of the affair, bring Cass to the understandable 
reflection that “all had come from my single act of sin and perfidy, as the boughs from 
the bole and the leaves from the bough” and, thereon, to an even more disturbing 
conclusion: “it was as though the vibration set up in the whole fabric of the world by my 
act had spread infinitely and with ever increasing power and no man could know the end” 
(178). Following this chilling insight, Cass’s life is a chronicle of guilt, failed reparation, 
and mental suffering. He is happy to die of a festering bullet wound. “I do not question 
the Justice of God,” he writes, “that others have suffered for my sin, for it may be that 
only by the suffering of the innocent does God affirm that men are brothers, and brothers 
in His Holy Name” (187). His view of the world as “all of one piece. . . . like an 
enormous spider web” is incomprehensible to Jack, who cannot accept or even 
countenance such a vision of unity and responsibility (188).  
Ultimately, Jack abandons the Cass Mastern project: “It had not been successful 
because in the midst of the process I tried to discover the truth and not the facts” (157). 
Leaving Cass Mastern and the doctorate unfinished, Jack attempts to prop up and sustain 
the idea that historians look only for facts and not for meaning, claiming that “a student 
of history does not care what he digs out of the ash pile, the midden, the sublunary dung 
heap, which is the human past. He doesn’t care whether it is the dead pussy or the 
Kohinoor diamond” (157). This curious formulation of procedural neutrality undercut by 
negative metaphors for the substance of the human past is the epistemological position 
that Jack brings to the investigation of his old friend, Judge Irwin. 
Needing to destroy the political opposition that Irwin embodies, Willie asks Jack 
to look into Irwin’s past for dirt: “‘Man is conceived in sin and born in corruption and he 
passeth from the stink of the didie to the stench of the shroud. There is always 
something’” (49). Jack expects to find nothing on the Judge, and proceeds to do “a 
perfect research job, marred in its technical perfection by only one thing: it meant 
something” (191). The research on the Judge sends Jack to family and to old friends. 
“The quick, sharp question may spear it up from the deep mud,” he theorizes, and while 
The Scholarly Attorney parries his questions about the past, Adam and Anne supply the 
information that the Judge once needed money, but that he had then married a rich 
woman (207). Certain that he will be able to tell Willie “No sale, Boss. He is washed in 
the Blood,” Jack immerses himself further in the investigation (215). He works through a 
series of metaphors for the past and for the experience of historical reconstruction: 
excavation, detective work, dreaming, and horticulture. He finds that as attorney general 
to Governor Stanton, Anne and Adam’s father, the Judge had taken a bribe—a job and 
stock in the American Electric Power Company—in  exchange for favors to the Southern 
Belle Fuel Company. The damning connections emerge as Jack applies the “flower-in-
the-crannied-wall theory”: “I plucked the flower out of its cranny and discovered an 
astonishing botanical fact. I discovered that its delicate little root, with many loops and 
kinks, ran all the way to New York City, where it tapped the lush dung heap called the 
Madison Corporation. The flower in the cranny was the Southern Belle Fuel Company. 
So I plucked another little flower called the American Electric Power Company, and 
discovered that its delicate little root tapped the same dung heap” (221).11 Another of 
Jack’s discoveries is the fact that Governor Stanton knew about his old friend, and that in 
Detels  10 
trying to protect him the Governor sullied himself. Although he does not tell Willie about 
the Judge, Jack uses the information about Governor Stanton to finesse Adam’s reluctant 
participation in a hospital project of Willie’s. And Jack learns that Anne is Willie’s 
mistress. 
 The convergence of his old ties with his present employment is significant for 
Jack, revealing to him that the seaminess of Willie Stark’s world is not confined to 
politicos or parvenus. Jack examines his past mistakes with Anne. Deciding that he has 
“handed” Anne to Willie, he drives suddenly west to California. Without realizing it, Jack 
is in pursuit of a new world view which will let him off this hook. On the road he finds 
the deterministic “Great Twitch,” so named for a hitchhiker Jack meets. “I did not ask 
him,” muses Jack, “if he had learned the truth in California.”  
 
His face had learned it anyway, and wore the final wisdom under the left eye.  
The face knew that the twitch was the live thing. Was all. But, having left that  
otherwise unremarkable man, it occurred to me, as I reflected upon the thing which  
made him remarkable, that if the twitch was all, what was it that could know that the  
twitch was all? . . .  
And if I was all twitch how did the twitch which was me know that the  
twitch was all? (314)12  
 
Despite these misgivings about his new insight, Jack returns home imbued with the 
enthusiasm of a recent convert. He contrives to witness a lobotomy that Adam is 
scheduled to perform:  
 
I felt all of a sudden that I had to see it. . . . In a hanging you do not change a man’s  
personality. You just change the length of his neck and give him a quizzical  
expression, and in an electrocution you just cook some bouncing meat in a wholesale  
lot. But this operation was going to be more radical even than what had happened to  
Saul on the road to Damascus.” (317) 
 
After viewing the operation, Jack ironically scolds Adam for failing to baptize the new 
creature “in the name of the Big Twitch, the Little Twitch, and the Holy Ghost. Who, no 
doubt, is a Twitch, too” (319). 
 Jack’s temporary refuge in biological determinism does not, however, release him 
from the need to know the truth about Judge Irwin’s bribe: “the truth is a terrible thing. 
You dabble your foot in it and it is nothing. But you walk a little farther and you feel it 
pull you like an undertow or a whirlpool” (343). At the same time, Jack’s putative 
allegiance to the Great Twitch is liberating. Under its aegis he need not take 
responsibility for the outcome of his research and, later, his confrontation with the Judge. 
When it comes, the confrontation contains revelations both for Jack and the Judge. The 
Judge learns that the ancient bribe is no longer buried. He learns, too, that Governor 
Stanton had known about it and had not only declined to take corrective action, but had 
attempted to shield his friend from its consequences. Judge Irwin refuses to be pressured 
by Jack’s threats of exposure and seems on the verge of a revelation of his own: “‘I could 
just say to you—I could just tell you something—’ He stopped, then suddenly rose to his 
feet, spilling the papers off his knees. ‘But I won’t’” (347). The puzzling moment passes 
and the interview ends, but not before the Judge calls Jack back to clarify one point: “‘I 
just wanted to tell you,’ he said, ‘that I did learn something new from those interesting 
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documents. I learned that my old friend Governor Stanton impaired his honor to protect 
me. I do not know whether to be more glad or sorry, at the fact. At the knowledge of his 
attachment or the knowledge of the pain it cost him. He had never told me. That was the 
pitch of his generosity. Wasn’t it? Not ever telling me’” (348). What the Judge reveals to 
Jack with his closing comments about the Governor and what he mysteriously withholds 
combine to form one meaning. The meaning is revealed by the Judge’s almost immediate 
suicide and the ensuing hysterics of Jack’s mother: “You killed him. . . . Your father . . . 
your father and oh! you killed him” (349). The Judge had intended the decision to 
withhold his true relationship to Jack to be interpreted in light of his final comments 
about the Governor’s knowledge and the Governor’s silence. Seemingly, the implication 
that is morality resides in “the virtue of affection” and in silence (348). Withholding the 
truth may be a lie, but it carries its own truth. 
 Jack’s discovery of the bribe sets in motion a series of web-like vibrations which 
result in several deaths: the Judge (suicide), Willie (assassination), and Adam, the “man 
of idea,” who has many reasons to kill Willie but does so, finally, because his picture of 
the world has been destroyed (436). Ironically, by a measured acceptance of 
responsibility for this carnage, Jack leaves the universe of the Great Twitch, on the one 
hand, and comes to recognize, on the other, that the spider’s web of responsibility 
envisioned by Cass Mastern must not be permitted to circumscribe the experience and 
exercise of freedom. Moreover, Jack’s ambivalent search for truth has been supplanted, 
through the crucible of bloodshed, by an acceptance of the past. It permits him to tell a 
generous life-giving lie to his mother, to marry Anne Stanton, to withhold the truth from 
those who would continue the vibrations of the web, to care for the Scholarly Attorney, 
and to live metaphorically and virtually “in my father’s house” (436).  
Even at his most intellectually dishonest and morally uncertain, Jack Burden is an 
immensely engaging and mentally agile character. In the course of his journey, Jack 
formulates truth, history, and fact repeatedly, often mixing and inverting metaphors, or 
offering conflicting formulations in the next breath. Many, if not most, of these 
formulations have more than a grain of the wisdom he gains in the end by embracing “the 
awful responsibility of Time” (438). Part of the difficulty in articulating the content of 
Jack’s later thinking is that it accommodates—at some level—all the formulations of 
reality and meaning that previously had kept him from a happy life. He concludes his 
research, as the novel closes, with a summary that illustrates his acceptance both of the 
provisionality of “pictures,” or symbolizations of reality, and the Jack Burden who had 
formulated them.  
By the time of his new beginning, the formulations have opened out in a way that 
permits him to live more authentically. One trace of this accommodation is Jack’s newly 
abstract and inclusive understanding of the word “father.” He has accepted the Judge as 
his natural father, and accepts appropriate, not total, responsibility for his death. He lives 
in his “father’s house” (a metaphor, really, for all the eventual accommodations of his 
soul) but is prepared to leave the Irwin place. He will leave it when he at last concludes 
the research on Cass Mastern he has resumed. Jack shelters the Scholarly Attorney as a 
son would an elderly father, and they live within the ambiguity of the relationship: “Does 
he think I am his son? I cannot be sure. Nor can I feel that it matters, for each of us is the 
son of a million fathers” (436). And Jack has made his peace with God, in recognizing a 
possible equation between what will be the Scholarly Attorney’s last tract on God’s 
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greatness and his own theodical struggles. “It would have been a thing of trifling and 
contemptible ease for Perfection to create mere perfection,” says the old man: “To do so 
would, to speak truth, be not creation but extension. Separateness is identity and the only 
way for God to create, truly create, man was to make him separate from God Himself, 
and to be separate from God is to be sinful. The creation of evil is therefore the index of 
God’s glory and His power. That had to be so that the creation of good might be the 
index of man’s glory and power. But by God’s help. By His help and in His wisdom” 
(437). No longer strong enough to do his own writing, the old man has dictated the 
passage to Jack, demanding fiercely to know whether Jack agrees. Jack says that he does 
“to keep his mind untroubled, but later I was not certain,” he muses, “but that in my own 
way I did believe what he had said” (437). The resonance of this theodical formulation 
with Cass Mastern’s understanding of human suffering suggests that Jack will be able to 
finish his dissertation. 
 In much the same fashion, Jack has come to a new understanding of what 
constitutes a great man, following a visit to Willie’s widow Lucy. Her husband and son 
Tom are dead, and she is alone but for Tom’s illegitimate child, whom she has adopted 
and named for Willie “because Willie was a great man. . . . I have to believe that” (426-
27).  
 
“I must believe that, too,” thinks Jack. “I must believe that Willie Stark was a great man. 
What happened to his greatness is not the question. Perhaps he spilled it on the ground 
the way you spill a liquid when the bottle breaks. Perhaps he piled up his greatness and 
burnt it in one great blaze in the dark like a bonfire and then there wasn’t anything but 
dark and the embers winking. Perhaps he could not tell his greatness from ungreatness 
and so mixed them together that what was adulterated was lost. But he had it. I must 
believe that.” (427) 
 
 Perhaps the most important in the series of existential tests to which the new Jack 
submits himself comes during a visit to his mother at Burden’s Landing. Jack’s mother 
has been curiously liberated by the death of Judge Montague Irwin. Having lived falsely, 
never admitting her love for the Judge, she will divorce The Young Executive, leave 
Burden’s Landing, and begin a new life somewhere else. But she still has a question for 
Jack: did the confrontation between Jack and the Judge have anything to do with the 
Judge’s suicide? 
 
  That was it. I knew that was it. And in the midst of the dazzle  
and the heat shimmering off the cement, I was cold as ice and  
my nerves crawled cold inside me. . . . 
       “No,” I said, “he wasn’t in any jam. We had a little argument 
  about politics. Nothing serious. But he talked about his health. 
  About feeling bad. That was it. . . .  
       “Is that the truth?” she demanded. 
       “Yes,” I said. “I swear to God it is.” (431) 
 
Jack recognizes that he has answered his mother’s gift of truth to him (“a new picture of 
herself, and . . . in the end, a new picture of the world”) with “a present, which was a lie:” 
 
  Well, I had given that lie to her as a going-away present. 
  Or a kind of wedding present, I thought. 
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  Then I thought how maybe I had lied just to cover up myself. 
  “Damn it,” I said out loud, savagely, “it wasn’t for me, it wasn’t.” 
       And that was true. It was really true. (432) 
The historian’s commitment to truth is not what is on trial in this scene. Rather, it is the 
historiographic problem of interested representation. Accordingly, Jack questions the 
conflict between his new picture of the world, which leaves room for a generous truth-
dealing lie, and his fear that he is rationalizing the lie in obedience to the old picture, 
according to which a brass-bound idealist may reject pain as he goes along. It is a 
problem of integrity. As with the slow cultivation of belief that Willie had been a great 
man, Jack’s assertion that his lie is more than an attempt to protect himself requires a leap 
of faith beyond both deterministic frames, the spider’s web and the Great Twitch. This is 
a perennial problem for historians. 
 Jack’s spiritual journey, at the end of which he is poised before “the awful 
responsibility of Time,” has transformed him from fox to hedgehog, to borrow Isaiah 
Berlin’s metaphor, or from a knower of many things to a knower of one big thing. What 
is the big thing that he knows? Ever the historian, Jack frames his truth in terms of “the 
past and its burden . . . how if you could accept the past you might hope for the future, for 
only out of the past can you make the future” (435). The theory of the Great Twitch 
dissolves. What Jack had seen as the “doom” of Adam and Willie “to destroy each other” 
becomes instead life lived “in the agony of will.” Now when Jack weighs the “moral 
neutrality of history,” he hears the words “History is blind, but man is not” (436). 
Jack’s story is thus an imaginative expression of Tolstoy’s struggles in the second 
epilogue to War and Peace. Like Tolstoy, the character Jack Burden is a philosopher of 
history whose analyses of the assumptions behind historical points of view are much 
more incisive than his ability to form a unified vision that comprehends all the empirical 
data, the facts. Jack’s historiographic laboratory is his life. Unlike Tolstoy, who exposes 
the logical fallacies in historical points of view and their founding assumptions, Jack tests 
experientially the private and public consequences of a series of world views. He finds 
them insufficient, coming to the conclusion that life cannot be conducted according to 
such formulas. According to Isaiah Berlin, Tolstoy believed otherwise: “Tolstoy’s central 
thesis . . . is that there is a natural law whereby the lives of human beings no less than 
those of nature are determined; but that men, unable to face this inexorable process, seek 
to represent it as a succession of free choices, to fix responsibility for what occurs upon 
persons endowed by them with heroic virtues or heroic vices, and called by them ‘great 
men.’”13 According to this interpretation, the affirmation and representation of free will is 
the central issue for Tolstoy, just as it is for the fictional character Jack Burden.  
 Jack Burden escapes the fate of Oedipus at Colonus and of Berlin’s Tolstoy. 
Berlin makes a paradoxical observation concerning the fictional experiments of Tolstoy. 
“All of Tolstoy’s heroes attain to at least intermittent glimpses” of what Berlin terms an 
“inexpressible sense of cosmic orientation . . . ‘the knowledge’ of how to live.”14 Berlin 
does not explain how it is that Tolstoy’s inventions are privileged to see what Tolstoy 
cannot, but suggests that 
 
  Tolstoy, himself, too, knows that the truth is there and not ‘here’ – not 
  in the regions susceptible to observation, discrimination, constructive 
  imagination, not in the power of microscopic perception and analysis of 
  which he is so much the greatest master of our time; but he has not, himself, 
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  seen it face to face; for he has not, do what he might, a vision of the whole; he 
  is not, he is remote from being, a hedgehog; and what he sees is not the one, but, 
always with an ever growing minuteness, in all its teeming individuality, with 
an obsessive, inescapable, incorruptible, all penetrating lucidity which maddens 
him, the many.15 
 
Jack Burden is endowed through experience, suffering, and reflection with a vision of the 
whole. His vision is limited by the limits on human vision, a conundrum captured in the 
true image from which “the last veil will not be removed, for there are not enough years.” 
A hedgehog at last, Jack has secured his humanity not by detached and deductive 
philosophizing but by empirical experience, in the course of which “he had seen too 
many people live and die” (436). 
Jack Burden is an historian, driven to organize the past. Thus the mimetic urge to 
draw pictures of reality has not left him. “The awful responsibility of Time,” with which 
he suspends his story, is an authentic yet uncertain picture of how humans confront the 
past and the future. Unlike Tennyson’s flower in the crannied wall, the picture 
metaphorically confers a way to accept, rather than fully to comprehend, “what God and 
man is.”16 Jack Burden has moved past his conflicting desires to know everything and, 
simultaneously, to know nothing. That is an historiographic breakthrough that eluded Leo 
Tolstoy. 
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